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SUMMARY 
This article explores potential threats to the validity of consent in body donation and 
potential responses to such threats. To minimize abstract generalizations, the article 
draws particularly on United Kingdom regulations but each of the issues it explores is 
applicable in many countries. Methods used were searches of relevant (e.g., medical 
ethical) literatures using pertinent search terms (e.g., consent) and discussions with 
multiple stakeholders (e.g., family members of body donors). The main threats 
identified were (1) failing to adequately acknowledge relatives’ roles in donation, 
particularly as donation often cannot be completed without relatives’ active 
participation; (2) failing to ensure that donors are informed enough to be able to give 
valid consent, especially given ‘specification’ and ‘temporality’ problems inherent in 
establishing consent for body donation; and (3) failing to genuinely prioritize donors’ 
motives and concerns during and after obtaining their consent. Possible ways of 
countering these threats include layering information given and made available to 
potential donors and having donors consent not to ‘donation and anything that might 
follow’ but instead to ‘relative-acknowledged donation, selective explicit consent, and 
delegated decision-making’. The latter involves donors specifying and relatives 
acknowledging donors’ key preferences and prohibitions, among which is nomination 
or acceptance of specified proxies who may make decisions on donors’ behalf after 
their death. By making such changes, the validity of consent for body donation could 
be substantially improved in ways that also increase respect for both donors and their 
autonomy and these changes may also increase the number of completed donations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much medical teaching and research relies heavily on a regular supply of dead bodies and 
body parts (Smith, 2018). Obtaining donors’ informed consent is increasingly thought to be 
the best available safeguard against unethical body procurement and use (Champney et al., 
2018). This is because obtaining valid consent “can render actions morally permissible that 
would otherwise be wrong” (Grady, 2015, p. 855). This means that certain actions must be 
considered morally wrong and therefore impermissible unless valid consent is obtained. The 
validity of consent for any complex matter will always and necessarily be a matter of degree 
(O’Neill, 2003; Farsides, 2012; Boyd, 2015; Grady, 2015). This paper reviews both the 
ethical literature concerning requirements for obtaining valid consent and the procedural 
literature detailing how consent for body donation is currently actually obtained. To avoid 
vague abstractions, focus is given to the situation in the United Kingdom (UK) but the points 
made are globally relevant. The review identifies three key threats to obtaining valid consent 
within current procedures for obtaining consent for body donation. Having identified and 
explained these threats, the review details promising ways to ameliorate or remove them.  
 
METHOD 
The review was based on searches of anatomical, medical ethical, and psychological 
academic literatures using such terms as ‘consent’, ‘body donation’ and ‘posthumous 
donation’. Issues identified were also considered during discussions with multiple 
stakeholders, including anatomists, ethicists, and family members of body donors.   
 
  
 
CURRENT UK BODY DONATION  
Teaching and research using donated bodies and body parts is regulated in the UK primarily 
by the Anatomy Act 1984 (Anatomy Act, 1984) and the Human Tissue Act 2004 (Human 
Tissue Act, 2004). The regulatory body for the latter is the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) 
who explicitly state that they prioritize “the fundamental guiding principle of consent” (HTA, 
2017). Similar priorities guide regulatory bodies throughout Europe (McHanwell et al., 2008) 
and beyond (Riederer & Bueno-López, 2014).  
 
Under the Human Tissue Act 2004, valid consent must be obtained from people while they 
are alive for their bodies to be used for anatomical examination (including research, surgical 
practice, etc.) after their death. Only such first-person consent can be accepted. The easiest 
and most common way for people to register their willingness to become body donors is for 
them to contact a nearby establishment licensed by the HTA so that they can obtain, 
complete, and return an appropriate consent form (HTA, 2019), one version of which is 
shown in Figure 1. Eighteen licensed establishments share a postcode system to accept bodies 
donated within local geographical regions. In 2008 the number of bodies accepted was around 
900 (Smith, 2018). There are more medical schools in the UK than this, but some do not use 
human bodies for teaching (Heylings 2002; McLachlan et al., 2004). The London Anatomy 
Office (LAO) coordinates donation across seven medical schools and universities in London 
and the South East of England (HTA, 2018). The structure of regulation in the UK means that 
for each institution that holds an HTA license there is a License Holder (a Dean or Pro Vice 
Chancellor etc.), a Designated Individual (DI) (usually the Head of Anatomy), and then 
several Persons Designated (PD) (lecturers, and/or technicians who work within the license).  
The typical lines of reporting are shown in Figure 2.  
 
  
 
Although the HTA provide a template, there is no standard consent form. This means that 
slight variations exist across consent forms used in different regions. The LAO consent form 
invites people to consent to their donated bodies being “used for anatomical examination, 
education, training and research” and some information is provided about what this might and 
what it will not involve. For example, it might involve bodies being used for “Research in 
connection with disorders but organs will not be donated for transplantation”. All consent 
forms register how long donors give permission for their body to be retained and whether they 
consent to images being taken and used for education, training and research. Information 
included with the LAO consent forms repeatedly advises donors to discuss their donation 
wishes with their relatives but there is no requirement for them to do so.  
 
ISSUE 1. THE ROLE OF RELATIVES, FRIENDS, EXECUTORS OR SOLICITORS 
Despite there being no requirement for relatives’ participation during the consent process, 
donation is very unlikely to occur without relatives’ active participation. This is because 
various things have to happen after a death to allow donation to occur and several of these 
things require the voluntary participation of relatives (or others acting on behalf of the 
deceased although for convenience we will use “relatives” as a catch-all term). Foremost 
among the requirements placed on relatives is them needing to quickly inform the relevant 
HTA-authorized institution when a donor dies. If any relatives choose not to do this then an 
obvious consequence is that donation which otherwise might have occurred definitely will not 
happen. It is possible that the number of such non-facilitating relatives is substantial. The little 
evidence which exists suggests that a considerable number of would-be donors do not discuss 
their donation wishes with their relatives. A study in Turkey revealed that 80% of people who 
intended to donate had not discussed at all these intentions with their relatives (Gürses et al., 
2018). If donors and their relatives have not explicitly and thoroughly discussed their 
  
 
respective preferences and reservations, it seems at least possible that relatives will not 
facilitate donation in the immediate aftermath of their loved-ones’ deaths. This means that 
procedures to which people have consented and that they may actively desire sometimes 
(perhaps often) have a considerably reduced chance of being enacted; that bodies otherwise 
available for donation are sometimes (perhaps often) not actually donated; and that relatives 
may sometimes (perhaps often) experience avoidable anguish having been put into a position 
of authority and responsibility without their knowledge and having to make potentially 
devastatingly difficult decisions without any preparation immediately following the death of 
someone close to and often loved by them. 
 
Even in otherwise ideal circumstances, there is a long list of factors that can prevent donation, 
including post-mortem examination, certain infectious diseases, organ donation, exceptional 
body weight, death during public holidays, and many more. In such circumstances, relatives 
who expected donation to occur can be shocked and distressed when it does not, and also 
have to make funeral arrangements that they did not expect would be immediately necessary 
(Smith, 2018). There is no requirement on the part of donors or LTA-authorized organizations 
for relatives to be informed prior to donors’ deaths about any of these possibilities, still less to 
give their active consent for the responsibilities that they will have in various circumstances 
beyond their control.  
 
ISSUE 2. APPROPRIATELY INFORMED CONSENT 
Most everyday acts of consent are for clearly specified things to happen almost immediately 
and to take place over a relatively delineated period, e.g., as happens when one consents to a 
phone contract. It is unusual and perhaps unique that consent can be given many years in 
advance for a relatively poorly specified wide range of possible procedures of unknown 
  
 
duration. This is often what happens when people consent to become body donors and thus 
the consent they give is at increased risk of being invalid as moral permission for many of the 
procedures that can and do follow the mere act of donation. 
 
 
The HTA state that for consent to be valid: “it must be given voluntarily, by an appropriately 
informed person who has the capacity to agree to the activity in question. The person should 
understand what the activity involves [and] what the material risks are” (HTA, 2017). This 
immediately raises questions about what “the” activity of consenting to body donation is and 
what it means for donors to be “appropriately informed” about it. 
 
Beyond consenting to HTA-approved institutions taking possession of their bodies after 
death, the HTA considers that “consenting to body donation” also entails consenting to 
“removal, storage and/or use of material” from one’s body after death “for any scheduled 
purpose” (HTA, 2017). It lists among “scheduled purposes” such things as “anatomical 
examination; … obtaining scientific or medical information about a deceased person which 
may be relevant to any other person (including a future person); public display; research in 
connection with disorders, or the functioning, of the human body; … education or training 
relating to human health; [and] performance assessment” (HTA, 2017). The HTA also says 
that authorized establishments may “charge for providing human tissue to others for training 
and research, including those working for private companies” and it specifically requires 
donors to be provided with “easily accessible information about how and why they [i.e., 
authorized institutions] charge, and to whom they will supply tissue samples” (HTA, 2017).  
 
  
 
Beyond recognizing the range of things that may be done with and to donated bodies, it is also 
necessary to recognize the range of people who may conduct or witness these procedures. An 
incomplete list of such people includes anatomists, medical students, dental students, school 
children, the general public, physiotherapists, surgeons, massage therapists, medical artists, 
medical engineers, medical researchers, military researchers, technologists, and commercial 
organizations  (Borland & Condon, 2016; Jones, 2016; Champney et al., 2018; Smith, 2018).  
 
Perhaps in recognition of the wide range of ‘sub-activities’ that may be subsumed under ‘the’ 
activity of consenting to body donation, the HTA insist that for consent to be valid, it is 
“important to ensure that the consent sought from donors is fully informed” (HTA, 2017). The 
HTA heavily stresses this point, saying that “When seeking consent … full and clear 
information should be provided about the purpose for which consent is being sought.…This 
information should include the nature of the intended activities and the reasons for them … 
Consent is valid only if proper communication takes place and the person has a reasonable 
understanding of what is being explained to them” (HTA, 2017). Since the legal judgement 
reached in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) 2015 came into force, a 
“reasonable understanding” requires that donors need to be provided with enough information 
to ensure that they know about anything that they or ‘any reasonable person’ in their position 
would consider a material risk. This adds another layer of complexity to ensuring valid 
consent. Especially with the range of possibilities that exists, it does not seem unreasonable 
that a person with particular beliefs and capabilities might consider one or more of the 
procedures routinely carried out with donated bodies harmful, e.g., disrespectful, repugnant, 
ethically unacceptable, or otherwise damaging in some way to them, their legacy, their 
reputation, or their loved ones (Bach, 2016; Roach, 2003).  
 
  
 
All of the above contribute to what we have called the ‘specification problem’. Given the 
range of possible procedures and events that may follow donation, the number of people who 
can be involved in them, and the spectrum of things that could be considered unacceptable by 
a particular donor or a ‘reasonable person’, it just does not seem possible, and still less 
practical, to try to inform prospective donors about everything that they need to know to be 
able to provide fully informed consent for body donation and everything that might follow it.  
 
What we have called the temporality problem is distinct from but nevertheless also 
contributes to the specification problem. This problem arises because consent for donation is 
obtained long before donation occurs and longer still before donation-dependent procedures 
are completed. A donor could register at 18 years of age and die aged 108 and body parts 
from that donor could then be stored, displayed, and used for 100 years or more after their 
death, i.e., approximately two centuries after that person gave consent. Even if they were told 
about all the things that could possibly follow donation that were known about at the time of 
registration, societal and technological developments will inevitably have occurred in the 
period following this that enable things to be done with and to their donated bodies that they 
simply could not have been fully informed about with any specificity at the time that their 
consent was obtained (Jones, 2007; Cornwall, 2016; Cornwall et al., 2016; Márquez-Grant & 
Errickson, 2017; Champney et al., 2018; Gilbert et al., 2018). 
 
A somewhat metaphysical but nevertheless important aspect of the temporality problem is the 
‘identity problem’. People’s priorities and preferences can change across the life course and 
people often make decisions for the future on the basis of either what they want in the present 
or what they (sometimes incorrectly) imagine that they will want in the future. When a person 
completes an advance directive (e.g., a consent form) to state current wishes for the future, 
  
 
they do so with some degree of ignorance about what the future will bring, both in terms of 
context (e.g., potentially changing practices) but also in terms of personhood (i.e., potential 
changes in preferences). Because people can be rather poor at accurately anticipating their 
own future preferences (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), and because it is often not safe to assume 
that someone who neglects to opt out thereby also demonstrates continuing support for 
something (MacKay, 2015), this means that consent obtained in the past is not always a solid 
basis for assuming on-going consent and/or consent at some point in the future (Helgesson & 
Eriksson, 2011; Horn, 2014; Jongsma, & van de Vathorst, 2015; Custers, 2016; Stahl and 
Banja, 2018; Varelius, 2018).  
 
In combination, the specification problem and temporality (including the identity) problem 
seem to seriously undermine any notion that people can be fully or even adequately informed 
to give valid consent to ‘body donation’ as that phrase is currently construed by the HTA, i.e., 
to encompass both the act of donation itself and all of the many possible procedures that may 
follow it. Especially since the Montgomery ruling, some fear that authorities will seek consent 
by providing prospective donors with much more information than they want or could 
possibly effectively process, e.g., detailed explanations of cost-to-benefit ratios for every 
possible procedure that might follow donation (Roberts and Indermaur, 2003; Devaney et al., 
2018; cf. Berger et al., 2008). Providing prospective donors with an avalanche of often highly 
technical material is likely to undermine rather than enhance their ability to provide valid 
consent, let alone their ability to autonomously pursue subjectively important outcomes 
(Fennell & Jones, 1992; Gürses et al., 2018).  
 
  
 
ISSUE 3. IDENTIFYING AND SATISFYING DONORS’ DESIRES  
Given the challenges identified above, adequately informed consent might be best pursued by 
trying to find out what donors particularly want to achieve and to avoid when donating. It 
might then be possible to tailor procedures to maximally serve donors’ interests and at the 
same time obtain valid consent in ways that acknowledge both the role relatives play and the 
inherent impossibility of informing donors in detail about everything that might take place 
after donation. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that donors are primarily concerned about helping society, their 
loved ones, or both, although these dominant altruistic desires are often accompanied by a 
plethora of more idiosyncratic concerns. 
 
Despite the empirical literature being clear that many donors want to be ‘generally’ helpful or 
useful, it is often difficult to definitively determine precisely who they wish to help and 
specifically how. When prospective donors communicate such concerns, they tend to do so in 
rather vague, broad-brush ways. They say that they want to help mankind, society, the 
medical profession, or medical students and/or to make positive contributions to knowledge, 
science, medical research, or medical education and/or to ‘avoid waste’ (Fennell & Jones, 
1992; Richardson & Hurwitz, 1995; Bolt et al., 2010; McClea & Stringer, 2010; Cornwall et 
al., 2012; da Rocha et al., 2017; Cornwall et al., 2018. See particularly the review included in 
Gürses et al., 2018). These are not obviously identical concerns. Wanting to play one’s part in 
specific processes likely to “help medical students” (e.g., by providing a body for 
demonstration or practice of dissection) is not the same thing as being happy for one’s body to 
be used in any way that might conceivably “further science” (e.g., testing weapons’ effects). 
  
 
Providing even valid consent for one thing does not provide any sort of consent for 
completely different things.  
 
Beyond having an interest in being ‘generally’ useful in relatively vaguely specified ways, 
donors also or instead regularly report being motivated by much more specific desires to help 
their loved ones, i.e., their close friends, families, and communities. For example, registrants 
often express an interest in saving their relatives the financial or emotional costs of arranging 
funerals and attendant ceremonies (Bolt et al., 2010; Cornwall et al., 2018; Gürses et al., 
2018). Consenting to procedures anticipated to ease relatives’ burdens in particular ways is 
clearly not the same thing as consenting to practices that might in some way be considered 
“beneficial to society”.  
 
Further, although civic and familial altruism are the most common and perhaps the most 
motivating of concerns identified by body donors, prospective donors have also reported 
many additional or alternative concerns. When allowed to identify more than one reason for 
wanting to become body donors, McClea and Stringer’s (2010) 140 registrants gave between 
them 209 main reasons for bequeathing their body. Among the most common of such 
concerns that could accompany or replace civic and/or familial altruism were desires to 
express moral or religious values; to express gratitude for medical help currently or 
previously received, personally or by a loved one; to donate ‘on behalf’ of loved others who 
wanted to but could not personally donate their own bodies; to act as role models for family 
members and others; to achieve or to be consistent with a perceived sense of meaning, 
purpose, life-narrative, or reputation; to not be a burden on society, for example when 
expecting to be survived by no close family members; and to avoid personally unwelcome 
  
 
funeral practices (Richardson & Hurwitz, 1995; Bolt et al., 2010; McClea & Stringer, 2010; 
Cornwall et al., 2012, 2018; Gürses et al., 2018). 
 
Notwithstanding some clear commonalities and patterns in donors’ stated concerns, it is 
important to realize that there is no one-to-one correspondence between a donor having a 
particular motive and them giving or withholding consent for body donation. A desire to 
make a positive contribution to society after one’s death can motivate body donation but it 
can instead motivate organ donation, a process that in many cases precludes the possibility of 
body donation. Similarly, a desire to protect loved ones from distress can motivate people to 
become body donors so that their families are spared the sort of funeral that would otherwise 
cause them additional expense and misery (Bolt et al., 2010; Cornwall et al., 2018; Gürses et 
al., 2018). However, it can also prevent people from becoming body donors because they 
want to allow their families more time with their dead bodies or because they know that their 
loved ones do not like the idea of what will happen to their bodies post-donation (Şehirli̇ et 
al., 2004). 
 
One reason that particular motives are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure or to preclude 
people giving consent to become a body donor is that people have networks of multiple 
concerns that interact in complicated ways (Cornwall et al., 2018; Gürses et al., 2018; Olejaz 
& Hoeyer, 2016) and these may vary both across individuals (Bohl et al., 2013) and across 
time and circumstance (Flaskerud, 2017,b). People may have some concerns that push them 
towards donation and others that inhibit such donation. If people want to both ‘help science’ 
and ‘avoid family distress’, for example, whether or not they become donors may depend on 
which of these concerns proves to be the stronger, or it may depend on the influence yet 
  
 
further reasons pushing the balance one way or the other, e.g., relatives’ attitudes towards 
donation.  
 
In relation to this last point, it is important to note that donors’ self-identified concerns can 
either align with or oppose what they perceive to be others’ interests. In the examples above, 
donors typically wished to ‘help medicine’ and/or to ‘protect their loved ones’ (or similar) but 
there are also examples of donors rejecting or even opposing what they identify to be others’ 
interests, including those of the medical profession (Joraleman, 1995) and those of families 
(Barbieri, 2018). Thus, with respect to anyone or anything else (e.g., ‘medicine’, ‘science’, 
‘society’, ‘family’, etc.) donors can be altruistic, indifferent, or even antagonistic. That is, 
particular donors may or may not identify with the perceived interests of particular others and 
donors can instead or as well have relatively self-focused interests that either align with 
others’ interests or do not, and all of these interests can interact to make it difficult to establish 
what any particular donor (or ‘reasonable person’) would want in any given scenario (e.g., 
with respect to any given procedure). 
 
In summary, body donors have multiple and complex concerns and them giving consent for 
particular procedures that they expect to follow donation cannot be considered to provide 
valid consent for all procedures that may follow donation. 
 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
There are three mutually compatible changes to the current system that seem to offer promise 
for improving the validity of donor consent while also reaping other benefits such as 
optimizing donors’ and relatives’ autonomy, reassuring anatomists and others that their 
  
 
procedures are ethically appropriate and in line with donors’ wishes, ensuring that maximum 
numbers of potential donors become actual donors, etc. These are requiring donors to have 
relatives explicitly witness their consent forms, layering the information that is given and 
made available to donors and their relatives, and having a number of consent options 
including giving or withholding general and proxy consent.  
 
Requiring donors to have their closest relatives explicitly witness their donation form is a 
simple change from current procedures that seems likely to have enormous ethical and 
practical benefits. This would ensure that donors have the opportunity and the responsibility 
to discuss their wishes and concerns with relatives, in turn ensuring both that donors are 
helped and supported to explore morally and familially important issues thoroughly and that 
relatives are given an opportunity to express any concerns that they may have. The former 
should improve the quality of first-person consent and the latter should show appropriate 
respect for relatives’ needs, prevent them from being shocked by learning for the first time 
about their loved ones’ donation wishes at about the same time as those loved one’s die, and 
optimize the number of donated bodies that are actually received by LTA-authorized 
organizations.  
 
Layering information given and made available to donors and their relatives involves initial 
provision of only the most essential information in the most general terms, plus instructions 
on how to easily access further, more detailed information. Bunnik et al. (2013) recommend 
something similar in their “tiered-layered-staged model for informed consent” in personal 
genome testing. Where appropriate, this could be combined with provisions for donors and 
their relatives to ask questions and discuss issues, face-to-face or online, with perhaps a 
  
 
variety of other people, e.g., medical experts, other donors, relatives of past donors, etc. (cf. 
Kaye et al., 2013). 
 
Paralleling layered information provision is the possibility of layering consent. Having been 
provided with basic, essential information, donors could be invited to give “general” consent 
for anything and everything legal that might follow donation. However, information could 
also be provided in a way that gave donors an opportunity to learn more and then give explicit 
consent for and/or explicitly prohibit particular procedures or possibilities, e.g., ones 
developed after they gave consent or after they died. Additionally or alternatively, donors 
might be given options to explicitly declare values and concerns particularly important to 
them, such as “furthering medical knowledge”, “assisting medical education”, “acting in 
accordance with my religious beliefs”, or similar. This would allow specific donors’ specific 
wishes to be taken into account when deciding after their deaths if their consent could be 
justifiably assumed for particular procedures that perhaps were not even imaginable at the 
time they gave consent. In line with this, donors could be asked if they wanted or were willing 
to explicitly accept or nominate someone to make selected decisions ‘in their interests’ and 
‘on their behalf’ after their own deaths. This could be a specific person, such as a relative or a 
medical school’s Designated Individual, but it could instead be a group of people analogous 
to an ethics committee (Coggon et al., 2008; Farsides, 2012; Boyd, 2015; Sulmasy & 
Sulmasy, 2015; Gürses et al., 2018). These stewards would then try to make optimal decisions 
taking all relevant factors into consideration, including protecting the best interests of the 
deceased in light of all the information at their disposal. One advantage of consensus rather 
than individual proxy decisions is that the former may help avoid decisions being too heavily 
weighted by particular points of view, e.g., that of donors who registered their consent long in 
the past, relatives with strong but perhaps excessively self-serving views, or experienced 
  
 
anatomists whose training and practice have altered the ways that they think about bodies and 
what it is appropriate to do to them; Segal, 1988; O’Neill, 1988; Joralemon, 1995; Delaney et 
al., 1996; Sanner, 1997; Moreton, 1999; Corrigan, 2003; Şehirli̇ et al., 2004; O’Neill, 2013; 
Boyd, 2015; Winkelmann, 2016; Hall & van Niekerk, 2017; Olejaz, 2017; Shaw, 2017; 
Champney et al., 2018; Cooper, 2018). 
 
DISCUSSION 
A review of both the ethical literature concerning valid consent and UK recommendations 
about required and best practices when obtaining consent for body donation resulted in 
identification of three serious issues. First, body donors’ relatives are integral to and likely 
greatly affected by the process of body donation but play no required role in the process of 
establishing consent. This means that relatives are at least sometimes likely to be placed in 
distressing situations and react in ways detrimental both to the implementation of donors’ 
wishes and to an optimal supply of donated bodies. Second, consent is currently established 
using processes that are very unlikely to ensure that donors are fully or perhaps even 
adequately informed about the range of things that they are in practice giving consent to 
happen in the period during which medical school officials are responsible for what happens 
to their bodies and body parts. Third, the same processes of establishing consent (i.e., donors’ 
permissions) do little or nothing to establish donors’ preferences (i.e., their concerns). This 
severely restricts the possibility of establishing whether particular donors provided valid 
consent for (or indeed may have been enthusiastically in favor of) particular procedures that 
donors may not have realised were possibilities, e.g., because they were developed only after 
the donors died.  
 
  
 
The review also suggests that several relatively small changes could be made to procedures 
for obtaining consent that seem likely to have several relatively large positive effects. Such 
changes would be to include relatives in the process of establishing donor consent (and 
possibly obtain relatives’ consent at the same time); to provide prospective donors with 
essential information in ‘digestible’ ways while also making it easy for them to obtain more 
detailed information if they chose to do so; and to enable donors to both opt-in and opt-out of 
particular practices as well as to designate authorities to make further decisions ‘on their 
behalf’ after the donors’ own deaths. Each of these small changes seems likely to 
considerably improve the validity of donors’ consent as well as promote other ethical and 
practical benefits, not least enhancing donors’ autonomy and increasing the number of bodies 
that are actually donated. For all these reasons, we recommend that the following provisional 
recommendations are given serious consideration by everyone who is interested in optimizing 
the validity of donor consent.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Donors should have their closest relative formally witness their consent forms. 
2. Information provided to donors and relatives should be layered. Initial provision 
should include only essential, general information plus simple and clear instructions 
on how to easily get more.  
3. Donors should be able to explicitly give or withhold consent for a variety of options, 
from general consent to all procedures thought suitable by an anatomist to specific 
consent for particular procedures and/or to delegate or accept particular proxy decision 
makers. 
4. As much as possible should be established about what donors want to achieve from 
their donation and about what they specifically want to avoid. This may be 
  
 
accomplished via a combination of research into particular populations’ preferences 
and by individualized declarations made by particular donors.  
5. When the consent explicitly given by donors cannot safely be assumed for specific 
procedures, people deciding whether consent may nevertheless be safely assumed 
should take into account all information at their disposal, including donors’ specified 
wishes and fears, where available. 
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FIGURE 1: London Anatomy Office (LAO) Consent Form 
 
Part A: Donor’s Details - To be completed in BLOCK CAPITALS 
 
Title ______________Surname/family name ______________________________________ 
 
Forename(s) _______________________________________________________________ 
 
Address ___________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Postcode _______________ Tel no _____________________________________________ 
 
Date of birth ________________ Religion/faith group (if applicable) _____________________ 
 
I WISH TO DONATE MY BODY AFTER MY DEATH. I UNDERSTAND THAT IT MAY BE 
USED FOR ANATOMICAL EXAMINATION, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND RESEARCH. 
 
 
Part B: Consent - Please tick as appropriate 
 
1.  I do not place any restriction on the length of time that my body or body parts may be 
retained 
OR 
 
 My body can be retained for a maximum of 3 years and 
a.  Parts of my body may be retained upon conclusion of anatomical examination 
for longer than 3 years 
b.  No part of my body may be retained upon conclusion of anatomical 
examination 
2. I consent to images being taken of my body or body parts. I understand that they will be 
used for education, training and research and that I will not be identifiable in these images. 
 
 
Part C: Witness Details 
 
Full Name _________________________________________________________________ 
Address ___________________________________________________________________ 
Postcode _________________ Relationship to donor _______________________________ 
 
 
Part D: Signatures – To be signed and dated at the same time in each other’s presence 
 
Signature of donor _________________________________Date _____________________ 
 
Signature of witness ________________________________Date _____________________ 
 
Complete both forms. Return one copy to the London Anatomy Office and keep the other 
with your Will or legal papers. If you would like to receive a donor card please enclose a 
stamped addressed envelope. 
